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1 Introduction
A main focus of the piecemeal reform literature is to find simple and easily implementable
rules for tariff changes that lead to an unambiguous welfare improvement. Two such
rules have been very prominent: the proportionality rule, where all tariffs are reduced
proportionally, and the concertina rule, where the highest tariff is reduced to the second
highest level; see among others Hatta (1977a and 1977b).1
‘Welfare improvement’ is undoubtedly a natural target to have, but this does not
preclude policy makers to also have other targets. An example of such a target – that
arguably has more political visibility than ‘welfare improvement’ – is the government
budget. As Falvey (1994) has shown, imposing the constraint that tariff reductions must
not lower government revenue — which, needless to say, is a highly legitimate target to
have when government’s finances depend heavily on trade taxes — weakens the welfare
results that the proportional and concertina rules were so good in delivering.
To the rescue of simple reform rules, a recent paper by Keen and Ligthart (2002) re-
vives (and extends) a result first proven in Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994): a proportional
tariff reduction combined with a point-by-point consumption tax increase delivers both a
welfare and a revenue improvement. As Keen and Ligthart (op.cit) explain, this propor-
tional tariff-tax reform leaves consumer prices unchanged, and affects only the production
sector of the economy. Facing a reduction of implicit production subsidies (due to the
reduction of tariffs), the production sector will allocate resources more efficiently, which
in turn will lead to a ‘production efficiency’-driven welfare gain. At the same time, the re-
duction of implicit production subsidies will unambiguously increase government revenue
1A large part of this literature focuses in testing the robustness of these two rules in less simplistic
models (see, among others, Fukushima, 1979; Diewert et.al., 1989, 1991; Anderson and Neary, 1992;
Turunen-Red and Woodland, 1992; and Lopez and Panagariya, 1992).
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— obviously, a “win-win” advice.2 More interestingly, and perhaps more importantly, it
is an advice that currently the IMF and the World Bank have widely adopted in their
conditionality agendas.3
Having such an impact, this simple reform rule clearly deserves further investigation.
The present paper focuses on the impact that this reform has on the economy’s import
volume (in world price value), i.e. the so-called market access issue. Market access
is something that policy makers care about when negotiations for tariff reductions are
taking place, and it is something that the IMF and World Bank advisors expect to happen
when they advice tariff reductions — after all, advising trade liberalization should end
up increasing the value of imports!
Unfortunately, as this paper shows, the coordinated tariff-tax reform rule presented
above does not necessarily increase the trade of the country. While there will exist a (non-
linear) tariff-tax reform that unambiguously increases trade, we are uncertain whether
that reform would increase welfare. Finally we show that the trade increase that one gets
from implementing the (non-linear) tariff-tax reform is unambiguously smaller from the
trade increase that we get from a reform of only tariffs. This ranking also applies with
respect to the welfare effects of the two reforms. In that sense, and as far as it concerns
market access and welfare, coordinating tariff-tax reforms are doing worse than isolated
tariff reforms. Indeed, these are not attractive properties of an otherwise popular strategy.
Ju and Krishna (2000) are the first to focus on the market access effects of tariff
reforms. They show that the implementation of the two well-known tariff reform rules
(proportional and concertina) may easily reduce market access. More recently Anderson
and Neary (forthcoming) show that, in general, tariff reforms that lead to welfare im-
2Naito (2006) has recently added a third ”win” by showing that the above reform also facilitates
growth.
3Raising a cautious voice to this practice and advocating for a more country-by-country adoption of
this reform rule, Emran and Stiglitz (2005) show that the existence of an informal sector that avoids the
collection of consumption taxes can render this reform welfare reducing.
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provements do not coincide with tariff reforms that lead to market access improvements.
The present paper shows similar results but for the coordinated tariff-tax reform — a
reform that, as mentioned above, is widely used in IMF’s and World Bank’s stabilization
and structural adjustment packages.
2 The Framework and its Analysis
Consider a small open economy that trades N+1 goods, with good 1 being the numeraire
good. While commodity world prices pw are fixed, domestic prices are affected by per unit
import tariffs t and consumption taxes τ (no taxes are applied to the numeraire good).
We denote producer prices of the non-numeraire goods by p = pw+ t and consumer prices
by q = p+ τ.4
The equilibrium condition for the economy is described by the budget constraint that
the representative consumer faces, expressed below by using standard expenditure and
revenue functions:5
E(q, u) = R(p) +G (1)
where E(q, u) denotes the minimum expenditure necessary to achieve the utility level (u)
given consumer prices (q), and R(p) is the maximum output produced by competitive
producers that face prices (p) .6 G is the tax revenue from import tariffs and consumption
taxes and it is assumed to be distributed back to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion.
Moreover, it is defined as
G = t′(Eq(q, u)−Rp(p)) + τ ′Eq(q, u), (2)
where the partial derivatives of the expenditure and revenue functions (Eq ≡ ∂E/∂q
and Rp ≡ ∂R/∂p) represent the compensated demand vector and the supply vector in
4All vectors are column vectors with N rows. Transposition is indicated by a prime.
5The price of the numeraire good is suppressed in both the expenditure and revenue functions.
6Producers use K inputs of production that are inelastically supplied and therefore suppressed as
arguments in the revenue function.
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the economy. The difference of the two (Eq − Rp) represents the compensated import
demand. Market access (M) is defined as the world price value of this import volume:7
M = pw′(Eq(q, u)−Rp(p)). (3)
The tariff-tax reform that this paper considers is exactly the same as in Hatzipanayotou
et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002) and it is compactly written as
dt = −θt, θ > 0 and dτ = −dt, (4)
i.e. a radial reduction of all tariffs by a small amount θ accompanied by an equal increase
of all consumption taxes. Since q = pw + t + τ , this reform will leave consumer prices
unaffected (dq = 0).
We proceed by showing first the (known) effects that this reform rule has on welfare
and government revenues. We then investigate the implications that this reform has on
market access.
2.1 Welfare
Totally differentiating (1) and (2) keeping in mind that dq = 0 leads to:
(Eu − (t+ τ)′Equ)du = E ′qdt+ E ′qdτ − t′Rppdt
7Clearly, defining market access in this way, and examining how a reform affects it, makes sense only if
a numeraire good is explicitly defined and removed from the reform. If not, then pw′(Eq−Rp) represents
the world price value of the full trade vector which is naturally zero in equilibrium. By explicitly defining
a numeraire good, the balance of trade equation is pw′(Eq − Rp) + (E1 − R1) = 0, with −(E1 − R1)
defining the net exports of the numeraire good.
It should also be noted that market access is defined in terms of the world prices as these are the
prices that exporters get when they sell their products in a country and, thus, these are the prices that
negotiators use when negotiating market access.
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Imposing the reform (4) gives
(Eu − (t+ τ)′Equ)du = −t′Rppdt (5)
= θt′Rppt > 0
The positive sign is due to the fact that the production substitution matrix (Rpp) is
positive definite, provided there is some substitutability between the numeraire and non-
numeraire goods, and hence t′Rppt > 0. Assuming the so-called Hatta normality, Eu −
(t+ τ)′Equ > 0 and thus the welfare change is also positive (du > 0).
2.2 Revenue
It is just as straightforward to show that dG > 0. Differentiating (2), keeping in mind
that dq = 0, gives:
dG = (t+ τ)′Equdu− t′Rppdt−R′pdt (6)
= Eudu−R′pdt
= Eudu+ θR
′
pt > 0
where we use (5) in line two to simplify, and we apply the reform rule (4) in line three.
The positive sign to the government revenue change is due to the welfare increase proven
above (du > 0) and due to the assumption that tariffs are non-negative, i.e. t ≥ 0.
Alternatively, and looking at the three terms in the right hand side of (6), we can induce
that the first term is the combined change in tax and tariff revenue due to an income
effect; the second term is the change in tariff revenues at given prices (lowering tariffs
tends to increase imports even with no demand adjustment because supply falls); while
the third term is the net change in tax and tariff revenues at constant quantities (replacing
tariffs by consumption taxes for given quantities widens the tax base and hence increases
revenue).
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These are exactly the results derived in Hatzipanayotou et.al (1994) and Keen and
Ligthart (2002). Basically, while the reform leaves consumers unaffected, it leads to a
production efficiency effect that increases welfare. With respect to the revenues, one just
has to realize that while revenues from taxing consumers have been left unchanged, the
production subsidy expenses (indirectly imposed by tariffs) have fallen. The net effect is
higher government revenues.
2.3 Market Access
We now proceed to the effects that such a tariff-tax reform has on market access. Differ-
entiating (3) and keeping in mind that dq = 0, gives:
dM = pw′Equdu− pw′Rppdt. (7)
Before we proceed we note that the above equation expresses the determinants of
a change in market access in terms of the responses of the non-numeraire (importable)
goods as a whole, which makes it difficult to get a clear intuition. We can, however, easily
re-write Eq. (7) in terms of the numeraire (exportable) good using the linear homogeneity
properties of the expenditure and revenue functions.8 This yields
dM =
[
Eu − (t+ τ)′Equ − E1u
]
du+ [t′Rpp +R1p] dt
= R1pdt− E1udu (8)
8By definition it is true that E = qEq + E1. Thus, we can write
Eu = [pw + t+ τ ]
′
Equ + E1u =⇒
pw′Equ = Eu − (t+ τ)′Equ − E1u
Moreover, and due to the linear homogeneity of the revenue function (pw + t)′Rpp + R1p = 0, we can
write
pw′Rpp = −t′Rpp −R1p.
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where we have used (5) in line two to simplify. According to Eq. (8) the change in market
access is affected by the reaction of the exportable good’s supply to tariff changes, and
by the exportable good’s income effect. Making standard assumptions, viz. that the
exportable good is normal and that its supply increases as the supply of the importable
goods decreases (production substitutability), leads to a conflict of the two terms: while
lower tariffs will increase the output of the exportable good and thus exports, a welfare
increase due to lower tariffs increases the demand for the exportable good and thus reduces
exports.
Returning to (7) and substituting for du by using (5), we get:
dM = − p
w′Equ
Eu − (t+ τ)′Equt
′Rppdt− pw′Rppdt
= − (pw + βt)′Rppdt (9)
where β = p
w′Equ
Eu−(t+τ)′Equ is the marginal propensity to spend on importable assumed to
be between 0 and 1. It is straightforward to see that a radial reduction of all tariffs
by a θ amount, as it is prescribed by (4), will not necessarily lead to a market access
improvement, i.e. θ (pw + βt)′Rppt cannot be signed. Hence, the proportional tariff-tax
reform does not perform better in this respect than the tariff-only reform analyzed by Ju
and Krishna (2000).
The welfare effects of both reforms can be compared by subtracting (5) above from
the corresponding equation when only tariffs are reformed (which can easily be shown to
be (Eu − (t+ τ)′Equ)du = t′(Epp −Rpp)dt). This gives:9
(Eu − (t+ τ)′Equ)
[
du|Tariff − du|Tariff−Tax
]
= t′(Epp −Rpp)dt+ t′Rppdt
= −θt′Eppt > 0
Thus, the coordinated proportional tariff-tax reform gives rise to smaller welfare gains
9Note that we envisage an economy that at equilibrium has both tariffs and consumption taxes. The
policy makers can then choose either a reform of only tariffs, or a reform of both tariffs and taxes. Since
the effects of these reforms depend on the pre-reform equilibrium values, we can easily compare them.
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than the identical reduction of tariffs in isolation. Intuitively, the tariff-tax reform replaces
tariff revenue by a distortionary tax, which is worse in welfare terms than just reducing
the lump-sum transfer to consumers (which is what happens when tariff revenue falls as
a consequence of a reduction in tariff rates). Proposition 1 summarizes the above:
Proposition 1. A proportional reduction of tariffs together with a point-by-point increase
in consumption taxes may lower the value of imports. The resulting increase in welfare is
smaller than in the case where consumption taxes are held constant.
Ju and Krishna (2000) have shown that a tariff reform of the type dt = −θ (pw + βt)
will increase market access unambiguously. As pointed out by Anderson and Neary (forth-
coming), this ”Ju-Krishna rule” is special in that it is the only reform rule that does
not require any assumptions on substitutability between goods, and it is in this sense
analogous to the proportional reduction rule (where welfare effects do not depend on sub-
stitutability). We now show that combining tariff changes according to the Ju-Krishna
rule with consumption tax increases to hold consumer prices constant increases market
access. To this end, substitute for dt in (9) to give
θ (pw + βt)′Rpp (pw + βt) > 0
because Rpp is a positive definite matrix. However, this ”modified Ju-Krishna reform”
is neither simple — it both requires information about β and constitutes a non-linear
reduction of tariffs10 — nor can it guarantee a welfare improvement, as can be seen by
substituting for dt in (5).
Assume now that policy makers were to disregard the welfare issue and that we could
easily implement the modified Ju-Krishna reform. In that advantageous (for market
access) situation we are able to compare the tariff-tax reform with the reform of only
tariffs. In doing that we compare (9) with Eq. (15) in Ju and Krishna (2000), re-written
10To see this, we can write dti = −θ (pwi + βti) = −λti where λ = θ
(
τ−1i + β
)
> 0 is the non-linear
reduction term with τi = ti/pwi representing the ad valorem rate.
9
here for convenience (and in our notation): dM = (pw + βt)′ (Epp − Rpp)dt. Taking the
difference of the two leads to
dM |Tariff − dM |Tariff−Tax = −θ (pw + βt)′Epp (pw + βt) > 0
That is, the increase of imports under the market access increasing tariff reform is larger
than the increase in imports of the corresponding integrated tariff-tax reform. The in-
tuition is straightforward: Given that a tariff is equivalent to a consumption tax and a
production subsidy, the removal of tariffs removes two reasons for importing less (lower
consumption and higher production) while the removal of tariffs and the increase of con-
sumption taxes ends up removing only the production subsidy. The reform of tariffs alone
therefore increases imports by more than the tariff-tax reform. Proposition 2 follows:
Proposition 2. A reduction of tariffs according to the Ju-Krishna rule that is accom-
panied by a point-by-point increase of consumption taxes increases market access by less
than a reduction of tariffs alone.
Both propositions show that preserving government revenue (by increasing consump-
tion taxes) comes at a cost: In the case of (welfare increasing) proportional tariff reduc-
tions, the offsetting tax increase lowers the welfare gain. In the case of the (market access
increasing) Ju-Krishna reform, the tax increase lowers the market access gain. Increasing
consumption taxes furthermore does not help to remove the potential conflict between
welfare and market access targets. Whether the cost of preserving government revenue
is worthwhile is an interesting issue that can, however, not be addressed in the current
framework.11
11These sort of issues, viz. the ranking of alternative reform proposals in a given setup, can be addressed
by applying the framework in Raimondos-Møller and Woodland (2006).
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3 Conclusions
Recently, a new tariff-tax reform strategy has become popular among academics and
policy makers. It is a reform that reduces tariffs and increases consumption taxes by
the same amount. Such a combination has been shown to have positive effects on two
important targets: welfare and revenues. On the basis of this, the strategy has been used
extensively as advice to developing countries by institutions like the IMF and the World
Bank.
The present paper has shown that such a strategy may have an unintended negative
effect on the market access of the country, viz. that the volume of trade may fall. Even
when we assume that we can find a tariff-tax reform that will raise market access, this rise
will be smaller than the rise a reform of tariffs alone will lead to. A similar observation is
also noted for the welfare gain. In that sense, the tariff-tax reform proposal is less efficient
than the standard reform of only tariffs. These drawbacks ought to be taken into account
by policy advisors in the IMF and the World Bank when incorporating this reform in
their stabilization and structural adjustments programs.
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